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A B S T R A C T
This paper presents an alternative implementation of ﬁrm-level collective wage bargaining, where
bargaining proceeds as a ﬁnite sequence of sessions between a ﬁrm and a union of variable size. We
investigate the impact of such a ‘gradual’ union on the wage-employment contract in an economy
with concave production. In a static framework, the resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the eﬃcient
bargaining outcome. In a dynamic framework with search frictions, we demonstrate that gradual collective
wage bargaining coincides with all-or-nothing bargaining when bargaining takes place in ﬁctitious time
before production.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The general assumption in canonical collective bargaining
models is that all employed union members return to the exter-
nal labor market permanently when negotiations fail.1 In many
real-world labor markets characterized by search frictions, such
immediate termination may not be an accurate assumption because
it entails, e.g., search costs of ﬁnding a new job, search costs of
replacing theworkforce and opportunity costs of forgone production.
Therefore, it is unlikely that neither the union seriously contem-
plates leaving the ﬁrm permanently, nor the ﬁrm credibly considers
dismissing its entire workforce.2
This paper presents an alternative implementation of decentra-
lized collective wage bargaining, replacing the usual ‘all-or-nothing’
union by our proposed ‘gradual’ union. Essentially, in a discrete labor
 We are grateful to the Editor, an anonymous referee, Pieter Gautier and Aico
van Vuuren for insightful comments. We especially thank Björn Brügemann for his
thoughtful discussions and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper.
1 For the ungoing relevance of union wage bargaining, especially for European
countries, we refer to Booth (2014).
2 Bauer and Lingens (2013) provide a rare example of Ronald Reagan’s dismissal of
air traﬁc controllers in 1981, arguably a political rather than an economic act.
setting, the latter implies that the union bargains on behalf of N
workers and if negotiations break down, the marginal worker leaves
the ﬁrm and the union rebargains on behalf of the remaining N − 1
workers, and so forth. In terms of interpretation, any time before pro-
duction, the ﬁrmmay ﬁre an employee, or alternatively, an employee
might grow frustrated and exit the ﬁrm after which bargaining
resumes. Such a collective bargaining environment is particularly
relevant in an ‘at-will ﬁrm’ where wage offers are unenforceable and
renegotiations are frequent. We refer to Hogan (2001) for a ratio-
nalization of the presence of a union in an incomplete contracting
environment.
We investigate the impact of a gradual union on the equilibrium
wage-employment contract in both a static and dynamic frame-
work of ﬁrm-level collective wage bargaining in an economy with
concave production. In a static framework, the resulting equilib-
rium is equivalent to the equilibrium under eﬃcient bargaining
(EB), which assumes an all-or-nothing union (McDonald and Solow,
1981). In a dynamic framework where the ﬁrm cannot instanta-
neously replace workers after a breakdown of the wage bargaining,
ﬁrm-level employment is no longer eﬃcient. We demonstrate that
gradual collective wage bargaining still coincides with all-or-nothing
bargaining when bargaining takes place in ﬁctitious time before
production.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2016.03.001
0927-5371/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Table 1
Characteristics of different bargaining arrangements.
Eﬃcient bargaining (EB) Intra-ﬁrm individual bargaining (SZ) Gradual collective bargaining
Solution concept Generalized Nash Generalized Nash Generalized Nash
Bargaining parties Union-ﬁrm Worker-ﬁrm Union-ﬁrm
Bargaining scope Wages and employment Wages Wages
Disagreement action All workers leave the ﬁrm One worker leaves the ﬁrm One worker leaves the ﬁrm
Nature of contract Binding Non-binding Non-binding
Our article relates to two strands of literature. First, our static
analysis reexamines the work of Stole and Zwiebel (SZ) (1996a,b) on
intra-ﬁrm individual bargaining under non-binding contracts, based
on the notion that contracts cannot commit the ﬁrm and its employ-
ees to wages and employment. The employment-at-will assumption,
together with employee hold-up power, yields ineﬃciencies in hi-
ring decisions. In equilibrium, the SZ ﬁrm overhires relative to
the neoclassical (NC) ﬁrm to such an extent that bargained wages
are driven down to the reservation wage.3 Our implementation
of gradual collective wage bargaining allows to investigate how
equilibrium wages and proﬁts of SZ’s at-will ﬁrm alter when bar-
gaining takes place collectively rather than individually. Similar to
all-or-nothing collective wage bargaining, gradual collective wage
bargaining removes the wage externality by hindering ﬁrms from
instantaneous renegotiations with individual workers. Table 1 sum-
marizes various characteristics of the different bargaining arrange-
ments that are compared in our static analysis.
Second, we introduce a gradual union into the rent-sharing li-
terature analyzing the interaction of search frictions and distortions
caused by collective wage bargaining in a dynamic setting. We build
on the work of Bauer and Lingens (BL) (2013) who investigate this
interaction under the assumption of an all-or-nothing union in a
large-ﬁrm random search model. In case the ﬁrm cannot immedi-
ately replace its workforce, two competing effects emerge: a strate-
gic overhiring effect as in the SZ environment and a countervailing
wage rise effect typical of unionized bargaining. BL demonstrate
that the latter effect is more important and ﬁrm-level and aggre-
gate employment are ineﬃciently low when the number of ﬁrms is
held constant. We complement the analysis of BL by showing the
equivalence between gradual and all-or-nothing bargaining when
bargaining takes place in ﬁctitious time before production starts.
The fact that also under gradual bargaining all employees may exit
off the equilibrium path in the current period explains this equiva-
lence result. We conclude that ineﬃciencies in hiring decisions that
arise in an economy characterized by search frictions and collective
wage bargaining are not driven by the particular implementation of
ﬁrm-level all-or-nothing collective bargaining.
The plan of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the gradual union in a static SZ framework. Section 3 extends the
analysis to a dynamic large-ﬁrm search and bargaining environment.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Gradual collective wage bargaining without search frictions
In Section 2.1, we present our gradual collective wage bargai-
ning model in a static SZ framework with discrete labor and with-
out externalities arising from job search. In Section 2.2, we derive
the equilibrium wage-employment contract and demonstrate its
3 Stole and Zwiebel (1996a)propose an extensive-form bargaining game and claim
that the proﬁles of wages and proﬁts in the subgame perfect equilibrium coincidewith
the Shapley values. Brügemann et al. (2015) show that this claim is incorrect. They
propose an alternative extensive-form bargaining game, the Rolodex game, in which
the proﬁles of wages and proﬁts in the subgame perfect equilibrium do coincide with
the Shapley values. They also demonstrate that overhiring is larger when wages are
set according to the SZ game than according to the Rolodex game.
equivalence with the equilibrium wage-employment contract under
eﬃcient bargaining.
2.1. Bargaining environment
Consider a ﬁxed-size union of N ∈ N members. A subset of N
union members (the employees) work in the ﬁrm. We assume that
the union is suﬃciently large to cover labor demand (N ≤ N ). We
endogenize the choice of N later on. We denote w(N) the employee’s
wage in a ﬁrm with N employees. The reservation wage is w. The
ﬁrm utilizes a single-asset, strictly increasing and strictly concave
production function F(N) : N → R+. We assume that F( j) ≥ jw for
j ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. Furthermore, F(0) = 0. Denote D the ﬁrst-difference
operator, e.g. DF(N) = F(N) − F(N − 1). The ﬁrm’s proﬁt function
equals P(N) = F(N) − Nw(N). The neoclassical ﬁrm’s proﬁt function
is denoted by PNC(N) = F(N) − Nw. Both the ﬁrm and workers are
risk-neutral.
In the at-will ﬁrm, wage offers are unenforceable. Any time before
production starts, the ﬁrm may ﬁre an employee, or alternatively,
an employee may quit the ﬁrm. Employees are irreplaceable. An
employee who returns to the external labor market can never re-
enter the ﬁrm and stays a union member earning the reservation
wage.
Union preferences are represented by a utilitarian objective func-
tion. The union’s payoff when there are N employees equals:
Nw(N) + (N − N)w. (1)
The union’s payoff when there are N − 1 employees equals:
(N − 1)w (N − 1) + (N − N+1)w. (2)
Hence, the gradual union’s net gain from reaching a bargaining
agreement equals:
Nw(N) − (N − 1)w(N − 1) − w. (3)
The ﬁrm’s net gain from reaching a bargaining agreement equals:
P(N) −P(N − 1). (4)
Following the collective bargaining literature, we assume that
conventional generalized Nash bargaining is the appropriate solu-
tion concept. The bargaining scope is negotiation over wages alone.
The ﬁrm chooses the employment level that maximizes proﬁts. The
bargained wage follows from maximizing the Nash product Y:
Y = [Nw(N) − (N − 1)w(N − 1) − w]0[P(N) −P(N − 1)]1−0 (5)
where 0 ∈ [0, 1] denotes the workers’ bargaining power.
For the sake of expositional clarity, we present an extensive-
form bargaining game which unique subgame perfect equilibrium
corresponds with the equilibrium wage-employment contract that
follows from our static model.
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Fig. 1. The gradual union bargaining game.
Bargaining proceeds as a ﬁnite sequence of pairwise bargaining
sessions over wages between the union and the ﬁrm. In Fig. 1, each
bargaining session is depicted by a box, representing the number of
employees on which behalf the union is negotiating with the ﬁrm.
In the ﬁrst bargaining session, the union represents N employees.
In each bargaining session, either the union and the ﬁrm reach an
agreement (A), or negotiations break down (B). Whenever an agree-
ment is reached, the game ends. Whenever a bargaining session ends
in a breakdown, one randomly chosen employee exits the game for-
ever, after which bargaining instantaneously starts again between
the ﬁrm and the union representing the remaining employees. At
most N bargaining sessions can occur before the game terminates
in which case all employees have dropped out following failed
bargaining sessions.
Within each bargaining session, the union and the ﬁrm play a
variant of the Rubinstein (1982) alternating-offers game where the
ﬁrm and the union alternate wage offers. If an offer is accepted, pro-
duction occurs and the wage is paid. If an offer is rejected by the
ﬁrm (union), the bargain is either terminated by a speciﬁc separation
shock that hits at a rate 0f (0u) or proceeds to the next round, allow-
ing the ﬁrm (union) tomake a counteroffer. The game continues until
the bargaining parties are separated or reach an agreement, which
will occur instantaneously in equilibrium. Binmore et al. (1986) show
that the generalized Nash bargaining solution emerges for the limit
outcome where the time between offer and counteroffer approaches
zero.4
2.2. Equivalence with eﬃcient bargaining
Using the sharing rule that follows from maximizing Eq. (5), it
holds that:
P( j) −P( j − 1) = 1 − 0
0
( jw( j) − ( j − 1)w( j − 1) − w)
for all j = 1, . . . ,N. (6)
4 The bargaining power of the union 0 equals
0f
0u+0f
.
Table 2
Comparison of equilibrium wage-employment contracts.
Employment NEB = N = NNC < NSZ
Wage wSZ = wNC < wEB = w
Proﬁts PEB = P < PSZ < PNC
Since P(j) = F(j) − jw(j) and P(j − 1) = F(j − 1) − (j − 1)w(j − 1), it
follows that:
jw(j) − (j − 1)w(j − 1) = 0DF(j) + (1 − 0)w. (7)
Summing up Eq. (7) for j = 1, . . . ,N, we obtain:
Nw(N) = 0
N∑
j=1
DF( j) + (1 − 0)Nw = 0F(N) + (1 − 0)Nw. (8)
Using Eq. (8), the ﬁrm’s proﬁt equals:
P(N) = (1 − 0) [F(N) − Nw] = (1 − 0)PNC(N). (9)
Hence, the proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm chooses the employment level
that coincides with the optimal employment level of the NC ﬁrm that
writes binding contracts with its workers at the reservation wage. It
is well known that the optimal level of employment under eﬃcient
bargaining with risk-neutral agents also coincides with the latter. As
such, we obtain a powerful eﬃciency argument for gradual collective
bargaining.
Table 2 compares the equilibrium wage-employment contract in
our setting with those of the NC ﬁrm, the EB ﬁrm and the SZ ﬁrm.5
Our equivalence result with EB conﬁrms that in a static SZ envi-
ronment, collective wage bargaining removes the wage externality
by hindering ﬁrms from instantaneous renegotiations with its indi-
vidual workers. As Stole and Zwiebel (1996b, Sec. III.B.) demonstrate,
a union has the effect of linearizing the production function since the
ﬁrm is now dealing with a single entity whose marginal product is
identical to its total product. As a result, the bargained wage is no
longer a function of employment and thus, the ﬁrm has no strate-
gic overhiring incentive anymore. It is important that the eﬃciency
argument for collective bargaining holds irrespective of whether one
considers a gradual union (as we do) or an all-or-nothing union (as
in Stole and Zwiebel, 1996b).
In the next section we extend the analysis to a dynamic environ-
ment with search frictions.
3. Gradual collective wage bargaining with search frictions
In Section 3.1, we introduce the dynamic large-ﬁrm search and
bargaining environment of BL, following the work of Smith (1999)
and Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). In Section 3.2, we derive the wage
setting curve under gradual collective wage bargaining and show
that the equilibrium under gradual collective wage bargaining coin-
cides with the equilibrium under all-or-nothing collective bargai-
ning. In Section 3.3, we discuss the ineﬃcient equilibrium allocation
that emerges in our economy.
3.1. Environment
Time proceeds as a inﬁnite sequence of discrete periods, where
the length of a time interval is denoted by d. Consider a continuum
of workers and a large, countable number of ﬁrmsm. The population
5 The rankings in Table 2 assume that 0 ∈ (0, 1) in our setting, the EB setting and
the SZ setting.
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of workers, who each supply one unit of labor inelastically, is ﬁxed
and normalized to one. Each ﬁrm i opens a continuum of vacancies
Vi which involve ﬂow costs cd per vacancy and employs a continuum
of workers Ni. All agents are risk-neutral, inﬁnitely lived and dis-
count future income at rate r. All ﬁrms use an identical production
technology F(Ni) with the same properties as in our static model.
The aggregate number of matches between workers and ﬁrms
is given by M(U,V) = jUcV1−c , where j>0, c ∈ (0, 1), V is the
economy-wide number of vacancies and U is the pool of unemployed
workers. Let labor market tightness be denoted by h = V/U, the
vacancy ﬁlling rate by km(h) = M/V = jh−c and the job ﬁnding rate
by p(h) = hkm(h). At the end of each period, an exogenous proportion
ks of ﬁlled jobs are destroyed.
3.2. Equilibrium wage-employment contract
The timing of events is as follows. First, wages are bargained.
Then, ﬁrms choose the number of vacancies, given the bargained
wage. As the ﬁrm’s problem is stationary, it can be solved recursively.
In what follows, we do not explicitly consider the vacancy choice of
the ﬁrm but refer to BL for the derivation of the job creation curve,
which we here repeat for further reference:
∂F (Ni)
∂Ni
− ∂w (Ni)
∂Ni
Ni = w (Ni)+ (r+ ks)
c
km(h)
. (10)
We now turn to the derivation of the wage-setting curve for our
gradual collective wage bargaining setting.
3.2.1. Wage determination
We assume that we are in a steady state in which the ﬁrm always
returns to the target employment level Ni in the next period, irre-
spective of what happens in the current period. This implies that the
size of the union is constant atNi.
The utility of an employed worker in a ﬁrm with employment Ni
is:
We (Ni) = w (Ni) d+
1
1+ rd
[
(1 − ksd)We (Ni)+ ksdWb
]
(11)
whereWb denotes the outside option of the worker.
The utility of an employed worker in a ﬁrm with employment
Ni − e is:
We (Ni − e) = w (Ni − e) d+ 11+ rd
[
(1 − ksd)We (Ni)+ ksdWb
]
.
(12)
Next, we specify the union objective. With Ni workers, the payoff of
the union is:
X (Ni) = NiWe (Ni)+ (Ni − Ni)Wb. (13)
If e workers leave the ﬁrm, the payoff of the union is:
X (Ni − e) = (Ni − e)We (Ni − e)+ (Ni − Ni + e)Wb. (14)
Thus:
X (Ni) −X (Ni − e) = Ni
[
We (Ni) − We (Ni − e)
]
+ e
[
We (Ni − e) − Wb
]
= Ni [w (Ni) − w (Ni − e)] d
+ e
[
w (Ni − e) − r1+ rdW
b
]
d
+ e
1
1+ rd
(1 − ksd)
[
We (Ni) − Wb
]
. (15)
Turning to the ﬁrm side, the payoff (proﬁt) of the ﬁrm with Ni
workers is:
P (Ni) =[F (Ni) − w(Ni)Ni − cVi] d+ 11+ rdP (Ni) . (16)
Since the difference equation for ﬁrm-level employment equals:
Ni = Ni + km(h)dVi − ksdNi (17)
it holds that:
Vi =
Ni − (1 − ksd)Ni
km(h)d
. (18)
Substituting Eq. (18) in Eq. (16) yields:
P (Ni) =
[
F (Ni) − w(Ni)Ni − [Ni − (1 − ksd)Ni] ckm(h)d
]
d
+
1
1+ rd
P (Ni) . (19)
If e workers leave the ﬁrm, the payoff of the ﬁrm is:
P (Ni − e) =[F (Ni − e) − w (Ni − e) (Ni − e)
− [Ni − (1 − ksd) (Ni − e)] ckm(h)d
]
d+
1
1+ rd
P (Ni) .
(20)
Thus:
P (Ni) −P (Ni − e) =[F (Ni) − F (Ni − e) − Ni [w(Ni) − w(Ni − e)]
−ew (Ni − e)+ e (1 − ksd)d
c
km(h)
]
d. (21)
The surplus sharing rule following Nash bargaining in our gradual
union setting implies:
0 [P (Ni) −P (Ni − e)] = (1 − 0) [X (Ni) −X (Ni − e)] . (22)
Substituting Eqs. (15) and (21) in Eq. (22), dividing both sides by
e and taking the limit as e → 0 yields:
0
[
∂F (Ni)
∂Ni
− Ni ∂w (Ni)∂Ni − w (Ni)+
(1 − ksd)
d
c
km(h)
]
d
= (1 − 0)
[(
Ni
∂w (Ni)
∂Ni
+w (Ni) − r1+ rdW
b
)
d
+
r
1+ rd
(1 − ksd)
(
We (Ni) − Wb
)]
. (23)
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Notice that on both sides, the wage schedulew(Ni) enters only via
the derivative of the total wage bill. Isolating this derivative on the
left-hand side yields:
Ni
∂w (Ni)
∂Ni
+w (Ni) = 0
[
∂F (Ni)
∂Ni
+
(1 − ksd)
d
c
km(h)
]
+ (1 − 0) 1
d
[
rd
1+ rd
Wb − 1
1+ rd
(1 − ksd)
×
(
We (Ni) − Wb
)]
. (24)
Integrating Eq. (24) and dividing both sides by Ni yields the wage-
setting curve in our gradual collective wage bargaining setting:
w (Ni) = 0
F (Ni)
Ni
+
[
0
(1 − ksd)
d
c
km(h)
+ (1 − 0) r
1+ rd
Wb
−(1 − 0) 1
d
1
1+ rd
(1 − ksd)
(
We (Ni) − Wb
)]
. (25)
3.2.2. Equivalence with wage setting under all-or-nothing collective
wage bargaining
In order to show the equivalence with wage setting under all-or-
nothing collective wage bargaining of BL, we derive the steady-state
wage. In steady stateNi = Ni. Using Eq. (11) to solve forWe (Ni)−Wb
yields:
We (Ni) − Wb = 1r+ ks
[
(1 + rd)w (Ni) − rWb
]
. (26)
Substituting Eq. (26) in Eq. (25), multiplying both sides by (1+rd)
and subtracting rWb from both sides gives:
(1 + rd)w (Ni) − rWb
= (1+ rd)0
[
F (Ni)
Ni
+
(1 − ksd)
d
c
km(h)
− r
1+ rd
Wb
]
− (1 − 0) 1
d
(1 − ksd) 1r+ ks
[
(1 + rd)w (Ni) − rWb
]
. (27)
Solving Eq. (27) for (1 + rd)w (Ni) − rWb, using that 1 + (1 −
0) 1d (1 − ksd) 1r+ks = 0+ (1 − 0) 1d 1+rdr+ks , we obtain:
(1 + rd)w (Ni) − rWb = (1+ rd)0
0+ (1 − 0) 1d 1+rdr+ks
×
[
F (Ni)
Ni
+
(1 − ksd)
d
c
km(h)
− r
1+ rd
Wb
]
.
(28)
Dividing both sides of Eq. (28) by (1 + rd) and deﬁning
bˆ =
1
1+ 1−00
1
d
1+rd
r+ks
=
d
d+ 1−00
1+rd
r+ks
yields:
w (Ni) = bˆ
[
F (Ni)
Ni
+
(1 − ksd)
d
c
km(h)
]
+
(
1 − bˆ
) 1
1+ rd
rWb. (29)
Eq. (29) coincides with the wage-setting curve (WS) in BL
(p. 1075). In the latter, 1−00 is replaced by the ratio of separation rates
0u
0f
.
This equivalence between wage setting under gradual collective
bargaining and all-or-nothing collective bargaining arises because
also under gradual bargaining all employees may exit off the equi-
librium path in the current period. Hence, breaking the bargaining
process down in gradual steps does not affect the wage outcome. It
is important to note that our equivalence result is obtained when
bargaining occurs in ﬁctitious time before production starts.
As BL show, Eqs. (10) and (29) determine employment and wages
at the ﬁrm level. Employment satisﬁes:
∂F (Ni)
∂Ni
=
1
1 − bˆ
[
bˆ
1 − ksd
d
+ r+ ks
]
c
km(h)
+
1
1+ rd
rWb. (30)
Note that in the absence of search frictions (c = 0), employment
is eﬃcient as the marginal production value of a worker equals the
worker’s outside option, as long as the environment implies d → 0.
This observation conﬁrms our static equivalence result of gradual
collective wage bargaining and eﬃcient bargaining of McDonald and
Solow (1981) (see Section 2.2).
3.3. Ineﬃcient equilibrium allocation
We discuss the ineﬃcient equilibrium allocation that arises in
our search and collective wage bargaining economy in the case of an
exogenous number of ﬁrms. Given the equivalent wage setting under
all-or-nothing or gradual collective bargaining, this allocation coin-
cides with the equilibrium allocation of BL who derive that ﬁrm-level
employment and labor market tightness are ineﬃciently low. We
highlight the role of the curvature of the production function and the
union’s bargaining power in affecting the ﬁrm’s optimal employment
decision.
When workers cannot be replaced instantaneously, the ﬁrm has
an incentive to hire strategically, which can be seen from differenti-
ating Eq. (29):
∂w (Ni)
∂Ni
=
bˆ
Ni
[
∂F (Ni)
∂Ni
− F (Ni)Ni
]
≤ 0. (31)
This wage externality allows the ﬁrm to lower the wage by hi-
ring additional workers. In isolation, overemployment would result.
However, not only the incentive for overhiring emerges but bar-
gained wages also increase. This countervailing wage rise effect
arises for two reasons. First, workers’ ability to hold up production
increases ﬁrms’ costs of rejecting a wage offer. Second, overhiring
increases workers’ job ﬁnding probability and thereby decreases the
workers’ costs of rejecting a wage offer.
BL demonstrate that the countervailing wage rise effect domi-
nates the strategic vacancy posting effect by comparing the policy
function, which implicitly relates ﬁrm-level employmentNi to labor
market tightness h, in their all-or-or-nothing collective bargaining
setting to the policy function of a utilitarian planner. In a symmetric
stationary equilibrium where ﬁrm-level and aggregate employment
are constant, these policy functions take the following form (see Eqs.
(23) and (22) in BL):
∂F (Ni)
∂Ni
=
r+ ks + cp(h)
1 − c
c
km(h)
+
a1
1 − a1
(
−∂w (Ni)
∂Ni
Ni
)
(32)
∂F (Ni)
∂Ni
=
r+ ks + cp(h)
1 − c
c
km(h)
(33)
with a1 =
p(h)
r+ks+p(h)
. In Eq. (32), the Hosios condition is imposed
to ensure that the crowding externality of ﬁrms’ vacancy choice is
internalized.
An increase in the curvature of the production function(
via ∂F(Ni)
∂Ni −
F(Ni)
Ni
)
or a larger bargaining power of the union(
via bˆ
)
increases ∂w(Ni)
∂Ni in Eq. (31). Hence, ineﬃciently low equi-
librium ﬁrm-level employment negatively depends on both the
curvature and the union bargaining power parameters (see Eq. (32)).
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4. Conclusion
To acknowledge the prevalence of collective bargaining in con-
temporary labormarkets characterized by search frictions, this paper
presents an alternative implementation of ﬁrm-level collective wage
bargaining. In a sequence of bargaining sessions, the gradual union
bargains on behalf of its workers and if negotiations break down,
a marginal employee leaves the ﬁrm and the union rebargains
on behalf of the remaining workers. We investigate the impact of
gradual collective bargaining on the equilibrium wage-employment
contract in an economy with concave production.
In the static framework of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b), the
resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the static eﬃcient bargaining
outcome of McDonald and Solow (1981). The driving force behind
this equivalence result is that collective wage bargaining removes
the wage externality by preventing ﬁrms from renegotiating instan-
taneously with its individual workers. A union has the effect of
linearizing the production function. The bargained wage is no longer
a function of employment and the ﬁrm has no strategic overhiring
incentive anymore. The eﬃciency argument for collective bargaining
holds irrespective of whether one considers a gradual union or an
all-or-nothing union.
In the dynamic framework with search frictions of Bauer and
Lingens (2013), we demonstrate that wage setting under gradual
collective bargaining and all-or-nothing collective bargaining again
coincide when bargaining takes place in ﬁctitious time before pro-
duction starts. In case the ﬁrm cannot immediately replace its
workforce and abstracting from ﬁrm entry, it has been shown that
the wage rise effect typical of unionized bargaining dominates the
strategic overhiring effect. We conclude that the resulting ineﬃcient
equilibrium allocation in a search and collective wage bargaining
economy is not driven by the particular implementation of ﬁrm-level
all-or-nothing collective bargaining.
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